When You Wonder if You’re Becoming the Scapegoat

Being held accountable is not the same as being made the explanation. How to tell the difference while there is still time to respond.

Graham had been asked to explain why Project Meridian had gone wrong.

That, at least, was how the meeting invitation described it.

The project had replaced an ageing collection of systems at a mid-sized industrial parts distributor. The new platform was supposed to connect orders, stock allocation, warehouse picking and dispatch, invoicing, credit notes, and customer account reconciliation.

Instead, a major customer had been promised components the warehouse could not supply. Orders had been duplicated. Invoices did not reliably match dispatches. Credit notes were not consistently reflected in customer accounts.

The customer had sourced components elsewhere, incurred additional costs and rescheduled production. It was now seeking compensation. Other customers were disputing invoices and withholding payment.

The board wanted an explanation. External lawyers had advised the company to preserve relevant records.

Graham had been programme director. He had coordinated the work, reported progress and managed dependencies between departments. He had not designed the software, controlled warehouse staffing, authorised every operational workaround or made the final decision to proceed.

But he had been the person presenting the programme’s overall status.

The internal review was now examining whether he had adequately warned management about the combined risks.


A few days after receiving the review’s formal questions, he met Adrian and Marcus in a pub.

Adrian had recently lost his own job following a workplace dispute. Marcus had spent years working around technology projects and organizational controls.

Graham put the letter on the table.

“Apparently, they want me to reconstruct what happened, explain what I knew and say why I didn’t recommend delaying the launch.”

Adrian read the first page.

“That’s quite a lot to put on one person.”

“It’s a review,” Graham said.

“Of course,” Marcus replied. “The important thing is what happens to the answers. Do they change the account of what happened, or just get collected before the original account is confirmed?”

Adrian turned the letter over.

“All right. What actually went wrong?”

The problems did not begin with the customer complaint

Graham explained that the system had three main problems.

First, the stock migration had confused two categories: stock already allocated to existing orders and stock available for new orders. Some stock that should not have been available appeared available.

Second, the new platform could send an order to the warehouse system, fail to receive the expected acknowledgement and try again. Under certain conditions, the retry created a second order rather than checking whether the first had already arrived.

Third, invoicing and reconciliation were unreliable. Invoices were generated from dispatch records, but dispatches, returns and credit notes were not consistently reconciling. Some customers received duplicate invoices. Others were invoiced for quantities they had not received. Legitimate credit notes were not always applied.

“Individually, those sound like different problems,” Adrian said.

“They were,” Graham replied. “But they interacted. The stock position could be wrong. The order record could be duplicated. Then finance couldn’t reliably establish what had actually been dispatched or what the customer owed.”

“So different departments could be looking at different versions of the same transaction?”

“Yes.”

Marcus nodded. “And manual corrections create another layer of records. If those don’t reconcile consistently, it becomes harder to establish which version is right.”

The problems had not appeared overnight. They had been identified during testing, discussed at project meetings and recorded in technical defect logs or raised by operational staff.

Martin, the executive sponsor, had approved the reduced testing schedule. The steering committee subsequently accepted the revised schedule and controlled workaround, and agreed to proceed.

“Did you agree with the decision?” Adrian asked.

Graham paused.

“I didn’t oppose it. I thought the individual issues had owners and that the workaround could be managed. But I didn’t have authority to approve the technical risks or guarantee the operational resources. I should have been clearer that I couldn’t establish whether the combined risks were adequately controlled.”

“That’s different from recommending that the programme proceed,” Marcus said. “You can accept a decision without having made it. But you still had a responsibility to report what you knew, and whether your overall status assessment conveyed the actual level of risk.”

Graham looked down at the letter.

“That’s what I’m trying to explain.”

“Then let’s work through it,” said Adrian. “Not just what they want to know. What you need to understand.”

1. What makes this time urgent?

The first formal questions had arrived after the customer complaint and the board’s demand for an explanation.

The review was no longer simply asking how the project had been managed. It was asking why Graham had not recommended delaying the launch, whether his status reports had accurately reflected the known problems, and whether management had been given a sufficiently clear picture of the risks.

Before the launch, the problems had been discussed as project issues. After the customer disruption, they had become potential evidence of management failure, financial loss and legal exposure.

The same records were now being examined in a different context.

“What’s changed?” Adrian asked.

“The consequences,” Graham said. “The customer is threatening legal action. The board wants answers. People are asking why we went live.”

“And you’re the person being asked to explain the reporting?”

“Yes.”

Graham showed them an extract from the review’s terms of reference.

The review would examine:

  • Whether programme status reporting accurately reflected known defects.
  • Whether the programme director had escalated material risks appropriately.
  • Whether the decision to proceed was supported by adequate information.
  • Whether the agreed workaround had been implemented effectively.

The first two points were closely connected to Graham’s work. The last two involved decisions and responsibilities extending beyond his role.

“That looks reasonable enough,” Adrian said.

“It might be,” Marcus replied. “But we need to see whether the review examines the decisions as well as the reporting. Finding that you didn’t make the combined risk clear is one thing. Establishing who accepted the risks, who authorized the testing reduction and who was responsible for making the workaround operational is another.”

Graham was being asked to explain decisions made over several months while the organization was under pressure to produce a coherent account quickly.

An investigation may begin after a crisis, when people want answers, management wants to demonstrate control and external parties are demanding explanations. The urgency is real. But urgency can also cause an organization to settle on an explanation before it has reconstructed the sequence of decisions.

The person being questioned may then find that the time available to explain the situation is much shorter than the time the organization has spent developing its initial account.

2. What would make this irreversible?

Graham had started collecting his records.

He had project status reports, meeting minutes, defect logs, emails, readiness assessments and steering committee papers.

He also had a draft summary prepared for the board shortly after the customer complaint.

The draft said that the programme director had been aware of unresolved technical defects and had continued to report the programme as manageable. It asked whether he had exercised appropriate judgement in recommending continuation.

Graham read it several times.

He recognized the facts. And he also recognized what was missing.

The draft did not mention that Priya, the technical lead, had recorded unresolved technical defects. It did not mention that Robert, the operations manager, had qualified operational readiness. It did not explain that the steering committee had accepted the workaround and authorized continuation.

It had also changed the language.

Graham had not formally recommended continuation. He had reported the programme’s overall status as manageable. He had not opposed the decision to proceed, but the decision had been made by the steering committee.

He sent Helen Ward, the Head of Internal Assurance leading the review, a correction. He explained that he had not had authority to approve the launch or independently authorize continuation. He also asked that the steering committee’s decision and the technical and operational qualifications be reflected in the account.

Helen replied:

“The board update is a high-level summary and is not intended to reproduce all supporting material. Your comments have been noted.”

Graham looked at the phrase comments have been noted.

He called Adrian.

“Is that enough?”

“Have they corrected it?”

“No.”

“Have they said they won’t?”

“No. They’ve said it’s a summary.”

Marcus considered the wording.

“A board update can’t contain every qualification. But if it’s being used to brief directors on responsibility, the qualifications need to appear somewhere in the material they’re given.”

“And if they don’t?”

“Then the board may receive an account in which the facts about your knowledge are prominent, while the facts about other people’s authority and decisions are not.”

Adrian tapped the paper.

“Your comments are noted. That’s something to watch.”

Graham frowned.

“So now I’m supposed to object every time someone writes a summary?”

“No. You’re supposed to identify material changes in meaning. Changing ‘reported the status as manageable’ into something that implies you recommended continuation is material. So is leaving out who actually authorized it.”

The draft had not been shown to have become the board’s settled account. Graham did not know whether it would be amended, supplemented or circulated in that form.

That uncertainty mattered. A provisional account can become the accepted account. The accepted account can determine who is trusted, who retains access to information, who gets to participate in decisions and whose explanation is treated as credible.

The person under review may still be allowed to submit comments. But if the organization has already acted on the emerging explanation, those comments may arrive after the most important decisions have been made.

An organization may need to contain a problem, protect customers or change responsibilities while an investigation is underway. The question is whether those actions are treated as temporary safeguards or as confirmation of a conclusion that has not yet been properly examined.

3. What is the obvious thing to do, that has become difficult?

“Get the records,” Adrian said. “That’s obvious.”

“I have them.”

“Then show them.”

“It’s not that simple.”

Adrian nodded. “I know someone who found out just how important those records can become. This man who taught writing at an English school. On the day he tried to resign, the woman running the school demanded that he delete the school’s WhatsApp messages from his personal phone.”

“And did he delete the chats?”

“He refused. The messages were records of what had happened at work. She locked him in the office and called the police.”

Graham looked at him.

“She called the police?”

“Yes. And things got worse. She subsequently made serious allegations against him. The WhatsApp records helped establish what had actually happened. If you meet him right now, he’d swear on the graves of his great ancestors that without those records, he would have been arrested and ended up in jail.”

Marcus looked thoughtful.

“So the records he was being told to delete became important evidence when the dispute escalated.”

“Exactly,” Adrian said. “He hadn’t kept them because he knew what was coming. He kept them because they were there, and he knew they mattered.”

There was a pause.

“That’s why I’d be careful about treating a request to delete records as a routine administrative matter,” Marcus said. “There may be legitimate reasons to manage or delete company information. But when a dispute is emerging, you need to understand what records exist, what you’re entitled or required to preserve, and what you must not do with them.”

Graham explained that access to the project records had become more complicated. Some material was held in shared project repositories. Some was held by individual departments. Certain meetings and corrective-work discussions were now taking place without him.

He had also been removed from the meetings where the organization was developing its response to the customer and planning the corrective programme.

“Who is running that programme now?” Marcus asked.

“Martin.”

Adrian looked up. “Martin? The executive sponsor?”

“Yes.”

“Was he involved in the decision to reduce testing?”

“Yes.”

“And the decision to proceed?”

“He was part of the steering committee.”

“And now he’s running the corrective programme?”

“Yes.”

“And you’re no longer in the meetings?”

“Correct.”

Adrian paused. “So the person whose decisions are being examined is now in charge of deciding what happens next?”

Graham nodded.

Marcus considered this.

“That creates a structural problem. Martin may have perfectly legitimate reasons for taking charge of the corrective work. But his decisions are also part of the sequence the review is examining.”

“So who checks the corrective programme’s account of what happened?” Adrian asked.

“That’s what I don’t know.”

Graham needed access to the records to answer the review accurately, but the work of reconstructing the programme was moving on without him.

“Ask for the material you need,” Marcus said. “Be specific. Identify the records, date ranges and decisions you’re trying to reconstruct. Ask who controls access and how you can obtain the relevant documents.”

“And if they don’t give them to me?”

“Record what you’ve requested, when you requested it and what response you received. Don’t turn a missing document into a claim about someone’s motive. But don’t let the absence of evidence become evidence that the event never happened.”

Graham made a note.

4. In uncertainty, who acts first?

The person who writes the first account, prepares the first summary or briefs the board can shape what everyone else has to respond to.

The next development came in a meeting with Helen.

Helen was not a software engineer. Her task was to examine programme governance, reporting, decisions and controls.

She asked Graham to explain why the overall status had been reported as manageable when technical and operational problems remained unresolved.

Graham explained that he had understood the individual issues to have owners and that the workaround had been accepted by the steering committee.

Helen asked whether he had considered recommending a delay.

“At the time, I believed the issues could be managed through the agreed workaround,” Graham said. “I was conscious of the timetable and the commitments that had been made. But I should have been clearer that I couldn’t establish whether the combined risks were adequately controlled.”

“Should the programme have gone live?”

“Based on what we know now, no. At the time, I should have made a clearer recommendation that we could not establish that it was safe to proceed.”

Helen noted the answer.

“That’s a significant admission,” she said.

“It is,” Graham replied. “But the steering committee had the authority to agree the revised schedule and proceed. My responsibility was to report and coordinate. Those are different responsibilities, and I think the review needs to examine both.”

“We need to avoid turning this into an argument about who is responsible,” Helen said. “The company needs accountability.”

“That’s why I’ve tried to distinguish the responsibilities,” Graham replied.

Helen said the review would consider his response.

The meeting ended.

A few days later, Graham received a summary of the discussion. It recorded his admission that he should have recommended delaying the launch at the time. It did not include his distinction between his responsibility for reporting and the steering committee’s authority to proceed. Nor did it retain the qualification that his answer about whether the programme should have gone live was based on what was known now.

Graham sent a correction.

He did not withdraw his admission. He asked that the summary also record who had approved the reduced testing schedule, who had accepted the workaround and who had authorized the programme to proceed.

The revised summary included his correction.

That mattered. It did not settle the review’s conclusions, but it showed that at least one part of the process could still be corrected when he challenged an incomplete account.

Adrian looked at the original summary again.

“That’s not what happened,” Graham said.

“No,” Adrian replied. “But it does happen.”

Marcus spoke without much expression.

“A while back, I received an email about a variance. By the time things went wrong and the investigators got involved, it had become a discrepancy. And things snowballed from there.”

Adrian nodded. “I had something similar happen to me. A staff member accused me of calling her useless. No one else heard the words, but the outcome letter said ‘supported by multiple members of staff’.”

Neither experience established what was happening to Graham. But both men understood why the first account, the first record and the first decision could matter so much.

Someone writes the first summary. Someone decides which records matter. Someone tells the board what happened. Someone decides who should lead the corrective work.

Those actions may be necessary. But they also shape what becomes possible afterwards.

The person being investigated is often responding to decisions already made by people who have more authority, more access to information and more control over the organization’s formal account.

5. Who benefits if nothing changes?

By this point, Graham had begun to separate what he knew from what he suspected.

He knew Martin had approved the reduced testing schedule. He knew the steering committee had accepted the workaround and agreed to proceed. He knew he had reported the overall programme status as manageable, and that he should have made the combined risk clearer.

He did not know whether Martin was deliberately protecting himself. He did not know whether the review would ultimately assign responsibility fairly. He did not know whether the board would receive a complete account.

But he could see the possible consequences of leaving the current arrangement unchanged.

The organization could produce a corrective plan, demonstrate that it had taken action and leave the larger questions about decision-making and risk acceptance unresolved. Graham could become the visible answer to a failure that had involved decisions and responsibilities across several parts of the organization.

The question was not simply who had made a mistake. It was whose explanation would become the accepted version, who would face the consequences and which decisions would remain outside scrutiny.

An organization may concentrate responsibility on the person who is easiest to identify, easiest to discipline or easiest to remove, while leaving the underlying decision-making arrangements largely intact.

This can happen through a series of individually understandable choices. The programme director has a visible role. His reporting can be examined and his mistakes can be documented. Other contributions may be spread across committees, departments, approvals and informal decisions. Examining those contributions may implicate senior people, disrupt the corrective programme or reopen decisions that the organization would prefer to treat as settled.

The result can be an account in which one person’s failures form a coherent explanation, while the wider sequence of decisions becomes background detail.

Sometimes this concentration is deliberate. Sometimes it emerges from people protecting their positions, avoiding disruption, preserving a timetable or simply trying to get the organization moving again. The effect can be similar even when the motives are different.

That is one way scapegoating happens.

It does not require the person selected to be completely innocent. Graham had made mistakes. His reporting had not made the combined risk sufficiently clear. He had not opposed the programme proceeding.

Those matters deserved examination.

But they did not automatically make him responsible for decisions taken by people with authority he did not possess, or for operational resources he could not control.

The question was whether the organization’s account would distinguish those things, or collapse them into one convenient explanation.

What Graham could do next

Graham could not compel Martin to invite him back into the corrective programme. He could not make the board revise its view. He could not require everyone involved to acknowledge decisions or omissions that had not yet been examined.

But he could protect the accuracy of his own account.

Marcus suggested a practical checklist.

1. Establish what you know.

Build a chronology from contemporaneous records. Identify when defects were raised, who received the information, what was decided and what happened afterwards.

Keep the original records. Do not rely on memory when a dated email, meeting minute or defect log exists.

2. Separate facts from interpretations.

Record what happened separately from what you think it means.

For example:

  • Fact: Martin approved the reduced testing schedule.
  • Fact: The steering committee accepted the workaround and agreed to proceed.
  • Fact: Graham reported the overall programme status as manageable.
  • Interpretation: The organization is concentrating responsibility on Graham to protect senior decision-makers.

The first three can be supported by records. The fourth needs further evidence.

3. Distinguish responsibility from authority.

Be precise about what you were responsible for, what you could decide, what you could recommend and what required someone else’s approval.

A person may be responsible for escalating a risk without having authority to resolve it. They may coordinate a decision without being the person who made it.

Those distinctions should not disappear simply because an outcome was poor.

4. Preserve relevant records lawfully and seek appropriate advice.

Follow applicable company policies and legal advice. Do not remove confidential material, forward restricted documents to personal accounts or access systems without authorization.

If there is a legal hold or preservation instruction, follow it. If you are unsure what you may retain or use in responding to the review, obtain independent legal advice.

5. Ask questions about the process itself.

You can ask:

  • What is the scope of the review?
  • Who is responsible for examining decisions made by senior management?
  • How will corrections to interview notes and summaries be handled?
  • What evidence is being considered?
  • Who decides whether the review’s conclusions are complete?
  • What happens to the findings when the corrective programme is developed?
  • What would cause the reviewer to change their assessment?

These are not attempts to obstruct an investigation. They are questions about whether the process can produce a reliable account.

What a fair process looks like

A fair process does not have to agree with the person being investigated. It may find that they made serious mistakes. It may impose consequences.

But it should remain capable of examining the whole situation.

Look for whether:

  • Corrections to the original account are accepted and reflected in subsequent records.
  • Decisions made by people other than the person under review are examined with comparable seriousness.
  • The investigation distinguishes what someone knew, what they could reasonably have known and what they had authority to do.
  • Evidence that complicates the emerging explanation is considered rather than automatically dismissed as an excuse.
  • The person being investigated can identify what evidence or finding might change the reviewer’s assessment.

None of these guarantees a fair outcome. A process can display some of these features and still produce a materially distorted conclusion.

But if corrections are repeatedly ignored, decisions outside the target’s control are excluded, and no evidence seems capable of changing the emerging account, those are reasons to pay closer attention.

The question is not whether the investigation feels uncomfortable. It is whether it remains capable of finding out what happened.

The review is still underway

A week later, Graham received another reply from Helen.

She confirmed that the review was examining programme governance and decision-making, including the decision to proceed with the launch. She said the review team would consider the records Graham had supplied and that he would be given an opportunity to comment on any material findings concerning him.

It was a reasonable response. It did not answer every question or tell him what the eventual findings would be. But it gave him something concrete to work with.

He sent the reply to Marcus and Adrian.

Graham:

Does this mean things are okay?

Marcus:

It means you have an answer to some of your questions. It doesn’t tell you what the review will conclude, how thoroughly it will examine the other decisions, or whether your response will affect the findings.

Keep watching the sequence. Are the wider decisions actually being examined? Are corrections being incorporated? Are you being given a meaningful opportunity to respond?

Adrian:

And don’t turn every subsequent email into evidence that they’re out to get you.

Graham:

You two make this sound wonderfully relaxing.

Adrian:

We aim to please.

Graham:

One other thing. Do either of you know whether the board update was ever revised?

Marcus:

No. You haven’t been told?

Graham:

No.

Adrian:

Then that’s still an unanswered question.

Marcus:

Ask what status it has and whether the qualifications you identified were included in the material given to the board. Don’t assume it was corrected. Don’t assume it wasn’t.

Graham put his phone down.

He still had no idea how the review would end. He might be criticized for his reporting. He might face employment consequences. The review might eventually examine the wider decisions and reach a more balanced account. Or it might not.

He had not been declared innocent. He had not been declared responsible for the failure.

For the moment, he had a clearer account of what he had done, a better understanding of what he had not controlled, and a record of the questions that still needed answers.

That was progress.

When you wonder whether you’re becoming the scapegoat

You do not need to establish that you are being scapegoated before you take steps to protect your ability to give an accurate account of what happened.

The five questions above are not five separate tests, each of which must produce a particular answer. Their value lies in looking at the answers together.

An urgent review may be justified. A draft account may be incomplete. Access to information may be restricted for legitimate reasons. A person may genuinely have failed in their responsibilities.

The warning lies in the pattern that emerges. Is responsibility becoming concentrated on one person while other people’s decisions, authority and contributions disappear from view? Are corrections being accepted in principle but failing to change the account? Is the organization becoming more certain about who is responsible while remaining less interested in how the situation actually developed?

Being criticized, investigated or held accountable is not automatically scapegoating. You may have made mistakes. You may have genuine responsibilities to answer for.

The warning sign is a materially distorted concentration of blame: when responsibility is placed on one person while significant decisions, authority, evidence and contributions from others disappear from the account.

The most important thing is to preserve your ability to describe what happened accurately, while the organization is still deciding what it wants the story to be.

If you are facing a serious workplace or organizational investigation, consider obtaining independent legal advice before responding to consequential findings or taking steps involving confidential records.


Centreline Clarity helps individuals make sense of complex, high-stakes organisational situations before they become institutional failures.

If you are trying to understand a situation in which the official account is moving faster than the evidence, the Centreline Clarity Structural Snapshot can help you map the dynamics, conditions and observable cues before deciding what to do next.


This article presents a fictional composite scenario. Names, organizations, events and circumstances have been constructed for explanatory purposes. It is not a description of any particular individual or organization, and it does not constitute legal advice.